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COMMENT
Employment Law: Acevedo v. City of Muskogee -
Creating a New Doctrine for Judging the Value of Public
Employee Speech Rights - Sound Policy or Doctrinal
Mutiny?
L Introduction
Of all the enumerated rights in the Constitution perhaps few are more cherished
than the right of freedom of speech. Americans, when faced with the opposing views
of others, have always been quick to assert their First Amendment right to guarantee
that their ideas are expressed.! However, as history has shown, freedom of speech is
not always an absolute guarantee. Certain types of speech that society considers
harmful or offensive are frequently banned'
One force exercising control over speech originates in the workplace. In that
setting, private employers often punish employees for certain types of speech
considered disruptive. Society as a whole, cognizant of the need for an employer to
place limited restrictions on its employees during working hours, generally accepts
such conditions as being a consequence of employment.
However, an exception to this general belief exists between the public/government
employer and its employees. Public employees, perhaps because they associate
themselves as an integral part of a government that promotes the free exchange of
ideas, often expect and have been granted extra protection for their worktime speech.
In addition, the state action doctrine, which exempts private employers from
constitutional restrictions, allows a cause of action for constitutional violations
perpetrated by the government.3 Nevertheless, limitations still apply, and the United
States Supreme Court has established certain tests to determine whether speech from
public employees should be protected. Such tests have generally been applied by
lower courts in evaluating speech rights.4
On April 11, 1995, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Acevedo v. City of Muskogee
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
2. See infra Part II of this comment for a discussion of specific types of First Amendment
limitations.
3. See generally Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Cr. REV. 221,231 (discussing state action and stating
that there must be some type of balance between the individual rights and the goals of the government).
4. See infra Part III(A)-(B) of this comment for a discussion of the tests used to determine the value
of public employee speech.
5. 897 P.2d 256 (Okla. 1995). The traditional test referred to in the text evolved from two United
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addressed, for the first time in the court's history, the issue of public employee speech
rights. In doing so, the court adopted the traditional test established by the United
States Supreme Court but failed to apply a 1994 modification that was made to the
doctrine.'
This comment will examine the Oklahoma Supreme Court's interpretation of the
public employee speech doctrine. First, this comment will give a brief history of
speech restrictions in conjunction with a detailed review of the United States Supreme
Court's decisions on public employee speech. Second, this comment will examine the
facts and procedural history of Acevedo, followed by a summary of Oklahoma's
interpretation of public employee speech rights. Finally, this comment will provide an
analysis of Oklahoma's public employee speech doctrine, contrasting it with
established Supreme Court doctrine and examining its constitutionality.
1I. General Restrictions on Speecff
Americans have always cherished their right to express themselves through their
speech. However, that right is not absolute. For reasons of national security, public
policy, or efficiency, Congress, as well as state and local governments, has occasional-
ly passed laws restricting individual First Amendment right of expression. When these
laws are challenged, the United States Supreme Court decides whether or not such
laws are constitutional. When determining the status of speech-restrictive laws, the
Court applies diffdrent levels of scrutiny. Laws which limit individual expression of
views will be scrutinized more harshly than laws which regulate speech for objectives
unrelated to the suppression of an individual's expression.8 Speech-restrictive laws in
the former category are generally reviewed by a judicial standard known as
"categorical balancing."
Categorical balancing, "as its name indicates .... is a combination of categorization
and balancing. It devises general constitutional categories through balancing the
interests relevant to the constitutional provision in question."9 For issues regarding
speech rights, categorical balancing classifies speech of little or no social value."0
Hence, laws which restrict specific forms of expression usually do so because that
States Supreme Court cases: (1) Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and (2) Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The 1994 modification referred to in the text comes from the Supreme
Court case of Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
6. See infra Part II(A)-(B) for a discussion of the tests used to determine the value of public
employee speech.
7. For a comprehensive discussion on categorical balancing and its effect on speech restrictions,
see generally Michael Kent Curtis, Critics of "Free Speech" and the Uses of the Past, 12 CONsT.
COMMENT 29 (1995); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality, 41 WAYNE
L. REv. 135 (1994) [hereinafter Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation]; Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory
of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297 (1995) [hereinafter Shaman, Low-Value Speech].
8. For examples of cases where the Supreme Court uses differential balancing to uphold speech-
restrictive laws unrelated to the suppression of an individual's expression, see United States v. O'Brian,
391 U.S. 367, 372 (19611) (upholding a law banning the burning of draft cards) and Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (holding constitutional a law forbidding nude dancing).
9. See Shaman, Ccnstitutional Interpretation, supra note 7, at 161.
10. See generally Shaman, Low-Value Speech, supra note 7, at 329.
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expression is considered to be of no social value." For example, in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire,'" the Court excluded a category of speech from First Amendment
protection if that speech constitutes "no essential part of any exposition of ideas and
[is] of such slight social value... that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."'3
When determining the degree of scrutiny to be applied when evaluating a law, the
Court first asks whether the type of restricted speech fits into a predetermined category
of high or low value. Hence, in cases involving the categorical balancing of a law
restricting speech of low social value, the Court will strictly scrutinize "all content-
based restrictions except for those directed at carefully defined categories of low-value
speech."'4 As a result, a law prohibiting speech that falls within a low value category
will generally be upheld and speech coming from that category will be deemed
unprotected so long as the law has been carefully drafted to limit its intrusiveness.
However, a law restricting speech that fails to come within one of these categories,
falls outside the scope of categorical balancing. Such laws are deemed un-
constitutional, and will be reversed unless the government is able to establish a
legitimate need for their existence. Three common categories of unprotected speech
are incitement, obscenity, and defamation.
A. Incitement
One type of speech failing to qualify for protection is that which advocates an
imminent lawless action. In Schenck v. United States,5 the United States Supreme
Court held that words constitute a criminal attempt to bring about a proscribed harm,
and therefore, are not protected when "used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger" that would bring about the harm. 6
Critics, concerned that any criticism of government policy would now be unprotected,
argued that the clear and present danger standard was too vague. Justice Holmes,
sharing the same concern, successfully modified the "clear and present danger" test
in his dissent to Abrams v. United States.7 Holmes, stating that the Constitution
recognized the special value of free speech, argued that the government should not
"check the expression of opinions... unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check
is required to save the country."'" Hence, an immediacy clause was added to the
clear and present danger test. 9
11. Examples of speech involving no social value are those involving defamation, obscenity, fighting
words, and incitement to violence or crime.
12. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
13. Id at 572.
14. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 46, 118 (1987).
15. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
16. l at 52.
17. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). In Abrams, the Court upheld the conviction of five Russian immigrants
for printing and distributing circulars which criticized American intervention in Russia during World War
I. See id. at 624.
18. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. d; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (providing no protection
1997]
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B. Obscenity
A second type of speech failing to qualify for First Amendment protection is speech
which is considered obscene. In Miller v. California,2' the United States Supreme
Court defined an expression as obscene if: (1) to the average'person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (2) the work depicts or describes, in an
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by statute as unlawful to portray;
and (3) the work taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.'
C. Defamation
A third type of speech not protected by the First Amendment is defamatory
speech.? The common law of defamation allows for recovery when: (1) a statement
was conveyed through voice or print; (2) that statement contained a defamatory
meaning; and (3) that defamatory meaning is reasonably understood by a third
party.? In addition, a further distinction exists in defamation cases involving a public
official. Unlike a private individual, a public official has an additional burden of also
proving that the defamatory statement was made with knowledge of falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth.
IX. Evolution of Public Employee Speech Rights
A. The Pickering and Connick Tests
While the previously mentioned speech limitations apply to everyone in the United
States, further constraints have been imposed on the rights of public employees when
acting within their scope of employment. Until the mid-twentieth century, public
employment was viewed as a privilege that the government could grant on its own
for words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace").
20. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
21. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
22. See id. at 21; see also A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).
23. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (6th ed. 1990) (defining defamation as "[a]n intentional false
communication, either published or publicly spoken, that injures another's reputation or good name").
24. See generally G-rtz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (stating that "[s]o long as they do not impose
liability without fault, states may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to private individual, at least where substance of
defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent"). The above common law
elements are those which have been generally accepted within the states as essential for defamation. See
also supra note 23 (defining defamation); Colin Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common
Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1962) (outlining the historical background of libel and slander, and
tracing the separate conception and development of the two torts in England); RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW
OF DEFAMATION 1-3 (1996) (listing the elements for the modem cause of action in a defamation suit).
25. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (establishing a higher burden
of proof for public officials bring a defamation suit).
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terms.' Generally, public employees were expected to accept the restrictions placed
upon their First Amendment rights or find employment elsewhere. 7 For example,
during the early years of the Cold War when McCarthyism ran rampant throughout
the country, the United States Supreme Court upheld legislation aimed at safeguarding
public services from disloyalty.2 Much of this legislation involved requiring
individuals to take loyalty oaths as a prerequisite to government employment.
However, gradually, through the persistent arguments of free speech proponents, the
Supreme Court began to reverse its earlier position on loyalty oaths. For example, in
Wieman v. Updegraff,' the Court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma law requiring
potential state employees to take an oath denying past affiliation with communist
organizations.3 ' Following Wiemann, the Court continued on a trend of disallowing
loyalty oaths in a series of cases decided during the 1960s' 2 As a result of these
decisions, the Court began to afford public employees legitimate speech rights similar
to those given to ordinary citizens under the First Amendment.
The 1968 Supreme Court decision in Pickering v. Board of Education33 represented
the Court's first attempt to establish conscious boundaries regarding the speech rights
of public employees. In Pickering, an Illinois public school teacher was discharged
for writing a letter criticizing the school board's policy in allocating funds.' The
board based the termination on the premise that the letter was "detrimental to the
efficient operation and administration... of the district."35
In holding the board's action unconstitutional, the Court noted that the threat of
termination from public employment served as a "potent means of inhibiting
26. See Mark Coven, The First Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public Employees, 12 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 559, 563 (1977).
27. See id.
28. See WEBSTER'S NEw TmRD WORLD DICTIONARY 838 (3d ed. 1988) (defining McCarthyism as
"the use of indiscriminate, often unfounded, accusations, sensationalism, inquisitorial investigative
methods, etc., as in the suppression of political opponents portrayed as subversive").
29. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (upholding New York legislation that
sought to bar from employment in public schools individuals who advocate, or belong to organizations
which advocate, the overthrow of the government by unlawful means); Ganer v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716, 724 (1951) (holding constitutional a Los Angeles ordinance requiring all city employees
to swear that they did not advocate the overthrow of the government by unlawful means or belong to
organizations with such objectives); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, 56 (1951) (affirming
Maryland statute requiring candidates for public offices to file affidavits stating that they are not
subversive persons).
30. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
31. See id, at 192.
32. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (invalidating New York statutes
barring employment on the basis of membership in "subversive" organizations); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897 (1961) (rejecting a statute allowing the government to
deny employment based on an individual's previous membership in a particular party); Cramp v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961) (holding unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring state
employees to execute a written oath stating no affiliation with the Communist Party).
33. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
34. See id. at 564.
35. Il
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speech."' Recognizing the desire to protect the ideals of free expression as well as
the state's interest in the efficient administration of public services, Justice Marshall
wrote that there must be a balance between the employee's interests in commenting
on a matter of public concern and the employer's interest in regulating employee
speech that would be both disruptive and interfere with efficiency?7 As a result, the
Court established a balancing test to apply the facts of each case with the goal of
protecting both the interests of the employee bnd the employer. The Court, however,
provided no standard for lower courts to determine when either the employee's or
employer's interest outweighs the other's interest?8
Fifteen years later in Connick v. Myers,39 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify
the manner in which the Pickering test was employed to resolve public employee
speech questions. In Connick, the Court held the termination of an Assistant District
Attorney for distributing a survey relating to personal grievances within the District
Attorney's office did not violate the employee's First Amendment right of free
speech.
In reevaluating the Pickering test, the Connick Court determined whether an
employee's speech is a matter of public concern to be a "threshold" question that must
first be resolved before any balancing of employee and employer interests can take
place.4' Justice White, writing for the majority, defined matters of public concern as
being "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community."42
Furthermore, he wrote that when a matter of public concern cannot be discerned,
"government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."43 Hence,
if the prerequisite issue of whether an employee's statement is a matter of public
concern is not answered affirmatively, the employee's speech will not be protected
under the First Amendment.
However, if an employee's speech is found to be a matter of public concern, the
Connick Court noted that an employer has the burden of demonstrating a strong
showing of workplace disruption before a termination would be justified.e The Court
listed the following factors to serve as a guide in determining whether or not a
disruption has occurred: (1) whether the statements are fact or ideas and opinions,"'
36. Ia at 574.
37. See id. at 568.
38. See id. at 569 ("Eecause of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements
by... public employees may be thought by their superiors... to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do
not deem it either appropriate or feasible to lay down a general standard against which all such
statements may be judged.").
39. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
40. See id. at 154.
41. See id. at 146.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 152.
45. See id at 154. The Court referred to and stated the popular phrase "under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea." l at 152; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
334 (1974).
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(2) manner of speech; (3) time of speech; and (4) place of speech.! However, as in
Pickering, the Connick Court failed to provide a standard for measuring when a work
disruption is significant enough to overcome an employee's right to speak on a matter
of public concern.47
As a result of creating the threshold requirement of first determining whether an
employee's speech is a matter of public concern, the Connick Court began to shift
away from the previous public employee speech standard outlined in Pickering!8 The
original Pickering standard involved a form of ad hoc balancing, where public
employee speech rights were determined by balancing the interests of the employee
against that of the employer. Connick's holding, on the other hand, created in essence
a two-tier system of review, requiring the Court to first determine that an employee's
speech constituted a matter of public concern before engaging in the balancing of
employee and employer interests.49 Hence, the Connick holding represents not only
a distinct movement away from the direct ad hoc balancing previously observed in
Pickering but also an attempt to create a more structured formula for reviewing public
employee speech cases.
B. Waters v. Churchill: Changing the Test
In 1994, the Supreme Court acted for a second time after Pickering in an attempt
to further define the test of public employee speech rights. In Waters v. Churchill,5
a plurality of four justices issued a decision narrowing the PickeringlConnick test. The
plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
as well as Justices Ginsburg and Souter, held that the "discharge of a public employee
could be sustained if the employer used reasonable procedures to determine that the
First Amendment did not protect the employee's speech."' In other words, an
employer must conduct a reasonable investigation using the Pickering/Connick
balancing test to ascertain whether the employee's speech warrants First Amendment
protection.' As a result, the new test purports to address a due process issue: the
need to ensure proper procedural safeguards in the critical pretermination stage.5'
46. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. See generally NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 327 (1974)
(stating employee speech which transpires entirely on the employee's own time, and in nonwork areas
of the office, bring different factors into the Pickering calculus, and might lead to a different conclusion).
47. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Picketing public
employee speech standard.
49. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Connick public
employee speech standard.
50. See generally Peter McCabe III, Connick v. Myers: New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights
of Government Employees, 60 IND. L.J. 339 (1985) (offering a detailed explanation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Connick).
51. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994) (plurality decision).
52. lId at 1891; see Bruce Bodner, Recent Decision, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 461, 476 (1995).
53. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1889 (1994) (stating for an investigation, "[olnly
procedures outside the range of what a reasonable manager would use may be condemned as
unreasonable").
54. See itL at 1890 ("Where an employee has a property interest in her job, the only protection we
1997]
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Furthermore, the Waters Court questioned whether the Connick test should be
applied to what the governmental employer thought the employee said or to what the
factfinder ultimately determines the employee said.55 In the end, the plurality adopted
an intermediate position, holding that a court should accept the employer's factual
conclusions, but only if the employer was reasonable in arriving at those
conclusions.
Justice Souter's concurring opinion, however, stated that in order to avoid liability,
the employer must not only reasonably investigate what was reportedly said but must
also believe the alleged statements were actually spoken.' Souter writes, "[a] public
employer who did not really believe that the employee engaged in disruptive or
otherwise punishable speech can assert no legitimate interest strong enough to justify
chilling protected expression, whether the employer affirmatively disbelieved the third-
party report or merely doubted its accuracy."58
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, wrote a separate concurring
opinion supporting tha plurality's assertion that public employers should possess the
power to dismiss governmental employees.59 However, Scalia disagreed with the
plurality's holding that an employer be required to conduct a reasonable investigation
before taking disciplinary action. He denounced the investigation requirement,
stating that it will inevitably create disharmony with earlier decisions involving
government employment and the Due Process Clause, which hold that public
employees lack a protected property interest in their jobs and therefore, are not entitled
to any sort of hearing before dismissal.1 Furthermore, he criticized the "reasonable
investigation" requirement because it will leave employers guessing whether or not
they have satisfied it.!2 In Scalia's opinion, the primary issue is whether or not there
has been governmental "retaliation for the employee's speech [which had been based]
on a matter of public concern."' As a result, Scalia rejected the plurality's procedural
requirement of a "reasonable investigation." Instead, Scalia advocated the continued
use of the Connick test to determine the degree of protection for public employee
speech.
The dissenting opinion to Waters, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice
Blackmun, examined what these two justices believed to be a flaw in the reasonable
belief standard. ' In the dissenting opinion, Stevens stated that the plurality goes too
far in allowing employers to dismiss employees who engage in protected speech if the
have found the Constitution gives her is a right to adequate procedure."); see also U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § I ("... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ... ").
55. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1880.
56. See id. at 1889-90.
57. See id. at 1891-92 (Souter, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 1892 (Souter, J., concurring).
59. See id. at 1893 (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. See id. at 1893-94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 1893 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. See il at 1898-1500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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employers have a reasonable belief the speech is not protected.' Instead, he wrote
that the best approach would be to have the trier of fact, rather than the employer,
decide what was actually said, and therefore determine if the termination was
justified.' Stevens' decision not to support the "employer reasonable belief standard"
is based on his belief that such a standard would provide less protection to a
"fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for less exalted
rights, including contractual and statutory rights applicable in the private sector."'
As an alternative, the dissent stated that public employers should have the right to
dismiss an employee only if the employee's speech is found to be "unduly disrup-
tive." Hence, the dissent seemed to have considered the plurality's "employer
reasonable belief requirement" a ruse, purporting to provide an extra level of employee
protection, while in fact doing the opposite by allowing for terminations based upon
an employer's reasonable mistake.
However, notwithstanding how one chooses to interpret Waters, it is impossible to
ignore the plurality's attempt to augment the government's ability to restrict the speech
rights of its employees. In writing the opinion, O'Connor noted the importance of
allowing the government greater leeway in restricting the speech of its employers as
opposed to the speech rights of its citizens. O'Connor wrote:
[Tihe government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does
the government as sovereign.... This assumption is amply borne out by
considering the practical realities of government employment, and the
many situations in which, we believe, most observers would agree that the
government must be able to restrict its employees' speech'
This statement, however, served a much broader purpose than mere dicta
reaffirming the Court's stance in previous cases. Instead, O'Connnor's statement can
be considered a catalyst, helping to justify the plurality's resolution to alter the test on
public employee speech restrictions. The result, an introduction of an employer
reasonable belief/reasonable investigation standard, served to further dilute the Court's
judicial review standard of categorical balancing, replacing it with a more deferential
reasonable standard of review.
Soon after the Waters decision, one commentator noted that:
In the aftermath of Waters, public employees can be discharged for
nondisruptive public concern speech. An employer need only show that
a reasonable basis existed for believing the statements allegedly made by
the employee were not protected by the Constitution. With the introduc-
tion of its reasonable employment decision defense, the Waters Court
made it much easier for public employers to justify adverse employment
65. Id. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1886.
1997]
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decisions that infringe upon the First Amendment rights of public
employees.7
Hence, by the spring of 1995, lower federal courts were beginning to apply the
Waters reasonableness standard.7" In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was at
that time hearing a case involving the speech rights of a government employee.
Consequently, the holding by the Oklahoma court in Acevedo v. City of Muskogee
has since raised perplexing questions regarding Oklahoma's standard of review of
public employee speech rights.
IV. Oklahoma's Application of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine
A. Acevedo v. City of Muskogee: Statement of the Case
On January 21, 1992, Muskogee Police Detective Art Acevedo was presented with
a termination notice.!3 The notice stated that Acevedo had acted in a manner
unbecoming the conduct of an officer.74 In addition, the notice listed three reasons
justifying his termination. The first reason involved conversations that allegedly
occurred between Acevedo and several rookie officers, in which Acevedo accused
senior departmental officials of criminal wrongdoing and subsequently asked the
rookie officers to report anything they observed directly to him.70 The second reason
pertained to a letter Acevedo sent to a National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) attorney accusing members of the legal community of
committing various criminal acts, covering up crimes, and participating in
discriminatory activities.76 Finally, the third ground for dismissal was based on the
fact that Acevedo had sent police reports containing the confidential notes of
investigative officers to the NAACP attorney in Washington, D.C."
The termination notice was issued following a January 13, 1992, hearing at which
six officers were called to testify as to Acevedo's previous actions.7 The transcripts
from the hearing indicated that one officer testified that he was with Acevedo when
the alleged conversations with rookie officers took place. 9 Further, a rookie officer
testified at the hearing that one such conversation, pertaining to alleged wrongdoing
70. Recent Decision, supra note 52, at 481-82.
71. See Jeffiies v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1995); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424,
446 (3d Cir. 1994); Wright v. Illinois Dep't of Children, 40 F.3d 1492, 1506 (7th Cir. 1994); West v.
Phillips, 883 F. Supp. 308, 318 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
72. 897 P.2d 256 (Okla. 1995).
73. See id. at 257.
74. See iU at 259 (qtoting the definition of "unbecoming conduct" from the Muskogee Police
Department's Policy and Procedures Manual as being that conduct "which brings the department into
disrepute or reflects discredit upon the officer as a member of the department, or that which impairs the
operation or efficiency of the department or officer").
75. See id. at 257-58.
76. See id. at 259.
77. See id.
78. The termination hearing was held before the Board of Supervisors, which consisted of the police
chief, the city's mayor, and two police officers. See id. at 257.
79. See id. at 258.
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within the police department, did occur between him and Acevedo.' In addition, a
veteran officer testified that Acevedo had initiated similar conversations with him
when he was a rookie. 1 This officer also testified that it had become common
practice within the department to avoid Acevedo, rather that listening to his
complaints.
Police Chief Gary Strum testified that there had been an ongoing investigation into
Acevedo's conduct from August 1, 1991, to January 13, 1992.' He further stated that
termination action was delayed because of Acevedo's participation in a grand jury
investigation of the department.' Strum testified that he did not want to interfere
with the detective's participation in the proceedings.'
Acevedo lost an appeal of the termination decision in district court.'M Subsequently,
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals found that: "(1) the employee's termination was
supported by the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) Acevedo's right to free speech
had not been unconditionally restricted."" The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether Acevedo's termination was consistent with the test
established by the United States Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers."
B. Summary of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's Decision
The court began its analysis of Acevedo's First Amendment rights regarding his
alleged statements by applying the balancing test as set out in Connick. Vice Chief
Justice Kauger, writing for the court, began the opinion by asking the Connick
threshold question of "whether the employee's speech constituted a matter of public
concern."' 9 Generally, a matter of public concern has been recognized as "any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community."' This question was settled
easily enough when the city conceded the issue in its brief.91 The city acknowledged
that speech disclosing governmental wrongdoing or misconduct is generally of public
concern.' Consequently, the subject matter of Acevedo's speech was recognized as
a matter of public concern.
80. The rookie officer testified that he and Acevedo went to lunch, at which time Acevedo asked
him if he knew of situations of impropriety in the police department. According to the officer's
testimony, Acevedo asked him if he was aware of a child molester in the department. Furthermore, the
officer stated that Acevedo mentioned that he believed someone had taken cocaine from the police
evidence room. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See i.d at 260.
84. See id. Acevedo participated as a witness in a grand jury investigation into alleged misconduct
within the police department. Acevedo, the primary witness, was unable to verify any of his claims in
front of the grand jury. Subsequently, the grand jury found no evidence of wrongdoing.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 257.
87. Id.
88. See i.
89. Id. at 261.
90. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
91. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 261.
92. See id.
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Next, the court addressed the second part of the Connick test by asking "whether
the employee's interest in expression outweigh[ed] any injury the speech could cause
to the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of public
services performed through its employees. ' Here, the court balanced Acevedo's
interest in protected speech against the overall disruptiveness of that speech to the
police department.' In doing so, the court reviewed the testimony of the two officers
who claimed Acevedo asked them to report anything suspicious in the department to
him, promising, in exchange, to advance the officers' careers for their assistance."
In addition, the court considered the testimony of an officer who said he began to
avoid Acevedo because the conversations were affecting his attitude about the police
department.' Kauger writes, "[t]hese statements ... indicate that Acevedo's speech
was highly disruptive to the operation of the police department.""u In the end, the
court upheld the lower court's decision that the interests of the police department
outweighed Acevedo's speech rights 8
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court adhered to precedent by applying the Connick
balancing test in Acevedo, the court failed to adopt the new standard of review set out
in the 1994 United States Supreme Court decision Waters v. Churchill." That
plurality decision requires governmental employers to conduct a reasonable
investigation into alleged statements before allowing an employee termination.
Consequently, courts reviewing governmental employee terminations are now expected
to integrate a reasonable investigation standard into their analysis when performing a
Connick balancing test.
Acevedo, in his brief to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, argued that the Board of
Supervisors at his discharge hearing "was required to find that the police chief
reasonably and honestly believed that his speech was unprotected before it could
uphold his termination."' 'u The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
because Waters is a plurality decision it is not applicable in the case at bar.'0 ' As a
result, the court followed only the standards of Connick and not the new reasonable
investigation requirement of Waters.
Justice Opala and Special Judge Chapel both wrote concurring opinions in an
attempt to explain why the Oklahoma Supreme Court chose not to apply Waters.
Opala writes that no plurality opinion by itself is precedential.lu
93. Id.
94. See id.; see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (1994) (emphasizing the
government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a relatively significant one when it acts as
employer).
95. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
96. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 258-62; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
97. Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 262.
98. See id.
99. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994). See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text for a full discussion
of the Waters opinion.
100. Acevedo, 897 P.22 at 260.
101. See id. at 260-61.
102. See id. at 265 (Opala, J., concurring).
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Though a ruling by a divided [United States] Supreme Court is conclusive
for the parties then before it, the opinion is not authority for the resolution
of any other cases either in that court or in any inferior court. No opinion
garnering fewer than five votes can be considered precedential
authority.I"
Furthermore, Opala states that it would be inappropriate to apply Waters, because
doing so "would be impermissibly dichotomizing federal law within this State.""l°
This is because, "[a]bsent any United States Supreme Court pronouncement, [the
Oklahoma Supreme Court] follow[s] as a matter of comity the substantive federal law
decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and that court's
constitutional jurisprudence applicable to the states.""In Opala continues by writing
that "[t]he voluntary deference we pay to our circuit's jurisprudence prevents federal
law within the State of Oklahoma from becoming dichotomized into one corpus of
norms administered by federal courts sitting within this State and another body of
precepts to be followed in Oklahoma state courts."'" Hence, Opala seems to indicate
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not follow a United States Supreme Court
plurality decision unless it is first adopted by the United States Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals."n
Special Judge Chapel, concurring with the result reached by using the Connick
balancing test, was less convinced in the wisdom of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision to disregard the holding in Waters." Chapel, believing at least part of the
Waters' analysis to be of value, wrote:
Waters determines that the Connick test should be applied to the facts as
the employer reasonably found them to be. The plurality opinion in
Waters also indicated that the employer must engage in some inves-
tigatory procedure, to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, in arriving at
a reasonable belief. While it is clear from the opinion that some
procedure must justify an employer's "reasonable" belief regarding
employee speech, the suggested requirement for an investigation is not the
heart of the opinion. Waters' importance lies in its determination of how
facts are to be determined under Connick.'
Hence, while Chapel questions the existence of a per se investigation requirement, he
does not doubt the validity of the Waters holding that an employer possess a
103. lId (Opala, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
214-16 (1942); United States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784,788 (10th Cir. 1976) (citing Hertz v. Woodman,
218 U.S. 205, 213-16 (1910)), vacated mem., 430 U.S. 925 (1977).
104. Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 264 (Opala, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 264 n.12 (Opala, J., concurring); see also Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135
(Okla. 1980); Lepak v. McClain, 844 P.2d 852, 860 n.8 (Okla. 1992); McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035,
1047 n.17 (Okla. 1990); Blanton v. Housing Auth., 794 P.2d 412, 418 n.5 (Okla, 1990).
106. Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 264 n.12 (Okla. 1995) (Opala, J., concurring).
107. See id. (Opala, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 266-67 (Chapel, SJ., concurring).
109. Id. (Chapel, S.J., concurring).
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"reasonable belief' -that the statements made by the employee are not protected before
speech-related job termination is allowed.
Before rushing to consider the Waters holding inapplicable in the case at bar,
Chapel believed the court must first determine whether that plurality decision had any
precedential value."0 Chapel disagreed with the statement by the majority that a
plurality opinion lacks any precedential authority. He wrote, "g1lower state and federal
courts must frequently parse the opinions included in plurality decisions to determine
whether a decision ccntains any common statement of law, or reaches a common
result, which can and should be applied in future cases."'
Chapel observes that in Waters, seven Justices essentially agreed that the Connick
test should be applied to the facts as the employer reasonably discovered them to
be."' The primary disagreement between these Justices focused on the requirement
of there being some sort of procedural investigation. As a result, Chapel asserts that
the Acevedo court, at a minimum, should apply the Waters analysis to determine
whether the police chief/termination board reasonably believed Acevedo's speech to
have been disruptive and therefore unprotected, without necessarily considering
whether or not a reasonable investigation was conducted."'
V. Analysis of Oklahoma's Public Employee Speech Doctrine
A. The Rule
If one takes a.literad interpretation of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in
Acevedo, the standard regarding public employee speech in Oklahoma becomes: (1)
apply the balancing test set forth in Connick in order to determine whether the
employee's interest in free speech on issues that constitute a matter of public concern
are of greater or lesser importance than the employer's interest in promoting both
efficiency and discouraging disharmony in the workplace; and (2) ignore the Waters
reasonable investigation element, at least until the Tenth Circuit adopts the plurality
opinion or the United States Supreme Court is able to give a clear majority ruling on
the issue.
B. Applying Connick
The Acevedo court, in applying the Connick balancing test, opted to follow the
traditional doctrine for resolving public employee speech disputes. The court's
application of the balancing test appears to conform to the procedure established in
Connick. The court reasonably ruled that Acevedo's statements constituted a matter
of public concern and hence passed the first prong of the Connick test."' These
110. See id. at 267 (Chapel, S.J., concurring).
111. Il (Chapel, S.J., concurring).
112. See id at 266-68 (Chapel, S.J., concurring).
113. See id. at 269 (Chapel, S.J., concurring).
114. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-46 (1983); see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct.
1878, 1884 (1994) (dicta expressly stating that in order for public employee speech to be protected it
must first be considered sp.ech expressing a matter of public concern); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 393 (1987); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-74 (1968).
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statements of alleged wrongdoing in the police department fit the definition of an issue
which would generally qualify as a matter of public concern."' The idea of
Acevedo's statements being a matter of public concern was further substantiated by
the city's own admission to the court that speech purporting to reveal governmental
corruption should always be taken seriously and considered a matter of public
interest."6 After reaching this conclusion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court proceeded
to balance the interests of Acevedo against the interests of the police department."7
In balancing the interests of the two groups, the court relied on the transcript of
testimony from fellow officers at Acevedo's termination hearing. The testimony
indicated that Acevedo's statements affected both the morale and efficiency of the
police department.?" In addition, Acevedo, prior to the termination hearing, had been
unable to prove any of his allegations during a grand jury investigation."9 As a
result of Acevedo's inability to substantiate his claims of departmental wrongdoing,
the court concluded that the police department's interests were greater than Acevedo's
speech rights.120
At first glance one might agree that the Oklahoma Supreme Court correctly
determined that the police department's interests outweighed Acevedo's interests.
However, a careful examination of the opinion fails to reveal any explicit explanation
behind the court's reasoning. The Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated that the
testimony from other officers seemed to show how Acevedo's speech generated
friction within the police department. However, the court neglected to share its
rationale in determining how it viewed the interests of the police department superior
to Acevedo's interests.
One possible explanation for the court's decision to assign greater weight to the
police department's interests is the fact that Acevedo was unable to convince the grand
jury investigating the alleged corruption allegations that any misconduct actually
occurred with the department.' This fact, by itself, seems to cast doubt on
Acevedo's credibility, especially since one officer, testifying later at Acevado's
termination hearing, indicated that Acevedo had stated that he had kept documented
proof of the alleged departmental misconduct.'" However, at the termination hearing,
Acevado was unable to provide any proof of wrongdoing. Therefore, as a result of the
apparent lack of evidence supporting Acevedo's claims, one might argue that a strong
inference can be made that the Oklahoma Supreme Court tilted the scales toward the
city when weighing the interests of the two sides. If that is in fact what happened, one
must next consider whether or not such a subjective judgment by the court is
appropriate.
115. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
120. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 262-63.
121. See id. at 260.
122. See id. at 259 n.3.
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In answering the above question it is important to remember that the Connick
balancing test is primarily a subjective evaluation of the particular facts in a case.
Such tests are often rightfully criticized. These tests require a court to assign a value
to one groups' interests and measure it against the interests of another group. Recall
the Connick balancing test requires the court to examine: (1) whether the employee's
statements are fact or ideas and opinions; (2) manner of speech; (3) time of speech;
and (4) place of speech.1 Rarely, however, are such factors clearly determinable
from the facts of a case."
Yet despite the above factors designed to aid in the balancing of group interests, of
important note is the Connick majority opinion that "a stronger showing [by an
employer of evidence indicating disruption and inefficiency] may be necessary if the
employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.""' As
previously mentioned, the city admitted in its brief that Acevedo's alleged statements
of police corruption were sufficient to constitute a matter of public concern." In
light of these facts, it appears the Oklahoma Supreme Court acted inconsistently with
Connick when it, either impetuously or purposely, favored the city's interests without
providing a sufficient justification to support its balancing rationale.
The above analysis indicates that the Connick Court recognized the existence of
varying levels of public concern. As a result, when speech relates to issues deemed
to have a higher level of public concern, the government is required to prove a
stronger degree of disruption or inefficiency in the workplace. These varying levels
of public concern pos.e an inherent problem for courts attempting to apply the Connick
test. Thus, it becomes important for courts balancing the interests of both the
government and its employees' speech rights to clearly specify the rationale behind
their ruling. Otherwise, these courts run the risk of implying a deference to a
particular side. In Acevedo, the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to provide any
reasoning to support its balancing of the two interests. This failure results in an
implication of judicial deference toward the city. However, such a problem can easily
be avoided if courts provide a detailed explanation of their balancing rationale.
C. The Oklahoma/Acevedo Standard: Additional Protection for Public Employees
or Illusory Shield?
Before considering the potential consequences behind the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's decision not to apply the Waters reasonableness standard to Acevedo, it is
123. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
124. For example, remember one officer testified that Acevedo made statements of police
wrongdoing while eating lunch at McDonald's. One could easily consider such a conversation as being
made by a person who is off duty and therefore freer to make private statements. Conversely, one could
argue that a police officer is on duty even while at lunch, and therefore words spoken during such time
are not automatically protected by the First Amendment. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 258.
125. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983); see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878,
1887 (1994) (stating when a government employee has a strong interest in speaking on a matter of public
concern "the government may have to make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to
be disruptive").
126. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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important to first examine the influence the decision has made in shaping Oklahoma's
public employee speech doctrine. Logically, such an examination must focus upon the
likelihood of obtaining a different outcome by following the Oklahoma rule: Acevedo
standard, rather than the test laid out in the Waters decision.
First, the predicted effects of the 1994 Waters decision should be recognized and
later contrasted with the potential effects of Oklahoma's policy. In doing so, it is
important to note that there are critics who argue that the long-term result of Waters
will be a devaluing of public employee speech rights.'" Such an argument originated
from legal scholars who view the reasonable test of Waters as a regressive trend,
loosening the standard of review courts apply in cases involving a determination of
the value of public employee speech.'" As mentioned, prior to Waters, the Connick
test established a structured formula to determine the protectability of certain public
employee speech; in other words, Connick protected such speech proven to be a matter
of public concern where it could be shown that the value of such speech outweighed
the resulting disruptiveness/loss of efficiency to the governmental employer."
One critic of Waters points out the failings of using a reasonableness standard of
review by writing:
Unlike the procedural obligations previously established by the [United
States Supreme] Court to protect the free speech rights of the American
People from overzealous regulation of subversive political speech,
defamation and obscenity, the due process obligations created by the
Waters Court narrows the scope of public employee First Amendment
freedoms. Further, contrary to prior Court decisions which emphasized the
importance of fact-finding process rooted in an adversarial, judicial
setting, the Waters reasonableness test gives employers the authority to
make binding factual determinations so long as they are reasonably
based.'"
However, perhaps the most egregious consequence of the use of a reasonableness
standard to determine the degree of protection afforded public employee speech is that
such a method allows a public employer to "discharge an employee on the basis of
a reasonable belief that the employee's statements were unprotected, even if that belief
is wrong."'' This result may occur because the Waters standard protects an
employer's decision, so long as that decision was both arrived at reasonably and
believed in good faith to be true." Hence, what can be termed the Waters
"reasonable employment decision defense" allows for extreme deference regarding a
public employer's decision, including going so far as to someday possibly condemning
someone for that which was never spoken."
127. See Recent Decision, supra note 52, at 483.
128. See id. at 489.
129. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
130. Recent Decision, supra note 52, at 488.
131. Id. at 490 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1889 (1994)).
132. See Waters, 114S. Ct. at 1878.
133. See Recent Decision, supra note 52, at 483-84 (referring to the deference in public employers
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Additionally, a critic could assert that the governmental goal of workplace
efficiency is itself threatened by the application of the Waters reasonableness standard
of review. The loss of efficiency is predicted to occur as a result of increased
apprehension from all public employees. It has been written that:
A freer hand for management to control objectionable employee speech
with traditional disciplinary techniques will, in turn, discourage employee
speech on the job. At-will governmental employees in our nation's
hospitals, schools, and public agencies will become increasingly reluctant
to criticize inefficient workplace policies and practices as they come to
realize that the [United States Supreme] Court has prioritized the needs
of governmental managers over free speech rights supposedly guaranteed
by [the] Constitution.'
Assuming the accuracy of the above assessment, one should genuinely question the
rationale behind the United States Supreme Court's decision to adopt a reasonable
standard of review for public employee speech. If in fact employees, out of a fear of
termination, feel compelled to remain silent and ignore potentially critical issues, there
is little doubt that overall efficiency in the workplace will suffer. As a result, one must
consider whether the means employed by the Waters Court are sufficient to create the
desired ends. Specifically, the question that should be asked is: Does the means, a
reasonableness standard of review, serve to create the desired ends, increased
efficiency in the wcrkplace; or as critics have pointed out, does the reasonable
standard have the opposite effect of inhibiting workplace efficiency? The United
States Supreme Court in Waters adopted the opposing view of critics, claiming that
a reasonable standard of review of public employee speech does in fact promote
workplace efficiency. Such a view originates from the theory that disharmony created
by inappropriate employee speech can easily be corrected by the use of a reasonable
standard for employee-speech-related terminations. Thereby, a higher level of
efficiency quickly returns to the workplace."
Applying the abov analysis to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Acevedo
allows the determination of whether a state court, through its adoption of an
independent public employee speech doctrine, will be able to avoid some of the
perceived pitfalls of the Waters decision." Specifically, it is possible to determine
whether the Acevedo standard offers public employees greater First Amendment
speech protection than Waters.
The major difference between the two standards involves the degree of scrutiny
applied to determine the validity of a public employer's decision to terminate an
employee based on that employee's speech. As mentioned, Waters uses a
reasonableness standard of review, while Acevedo employs the two-prong Connick
that the Waters reasonabl. standard seems to create).
134. Id. at 489.
135. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888.
136. See supra note; 127-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the perceived
problems of the Waters decision.
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balancing test." Hence, under the Acevedo standard, there must be a balancing of
employer/employee interests to determine whether speech constituting a matter of
public concern is afforded First Amendment protection." Consequently, it is easy
for one at first glance to assume that the Acevedo standard of review provides more
protection than the Waters reasonableness standard. However, as will be shown, such
an assumption could in fact turn out to be premature.
There is no question that the Acevedo standard acts to limit certain types of public
employee speech. For example, by directly modeling Acevedo after Connick, the court
provides no constitutional protection at all for private matters spoken by public
employees in the workplace. The Connick Court ruled that where an employee speaks
in the workplace "upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior."'39 The Connick Court further explained that "[the Court's]
responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue
of working for the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for
employee grievances not afforded [protection] by the First Amendment to those who
do not work for the State."'' Hence, as a result of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision to follow the rationale of Connick, one can safely assume that matters of
personal concern spoken in the workplace would also be afforded little if any
protection in Oklahoma courts.'
However, the above limitation on speech pertaining to matters of private concern
that exists in Acevedo is probably also present under an application of the Waters
speech doctrine. Waters provides for an employer to act against speech that is
reasonably believed to be disruptive to such a degree as to not warrant protection.
Consequently, there is no reason to believe that Waters rejects the notion that
employee speech relating to a matter of private concern, that is both spoken in the
workplace and subsequently deemed by the employer to be disruptive, lacks
protection.
Therefore, the strongest distinction between the two standards regarding the level
of protection afforded public employee speech is perhaps found in that type of speech
which is considered to be a matter of public concern. Acevedo's adoption of the
Connick balancing test requires the employee to establish that the questionable speech
constituted a matter of public concern. 42 If employee speech is found by a jury to
137. See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text for a full discussion on the Acevedo Court's
application of the Connick balancing test.
138. See Acevedo v. City of Muskogee, 897 P.2d 256, 261 (Okla. 1995).
139. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
140. l.
141. But cf. id. (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)). In Givhan,
the Court held that First Amendment protection lies when a public employee arranges to communicate
privately with his employer, rather than to express his views publicly. See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415-16.
Thus, there is a presumption that First Amendment rights will be afforded to an employee who discusses
outside the public setting a matter of private concern with his employer.
142. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
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be a matter of public concern, such speech becomes protected, that is, unless the
government-employer is able to show that its interest in efficiency outweighed the
value of the speech."t3 Thus, one result of the Connick/Acevedo balancing test is that
it acts to establish a ler se level of protection for speech consisting of issues of public
concern.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, however, is Waters. Unlike Acevedo, the
Waters reasonableness standard does nothing to establish a per se level of protection
for employee speech, even if that speech is deemed to have qualities of public
concern. Waters does require an application of the Connick test. However, that test
is applied to what the "government employer reasonably thought was said, not what
the trier of fact ultimately determines to have been said."'" As a result, the
reasonableness standard in Waters serves to effectively prejudice the purpose behind
the balancing of interests. This occurs because the jury is required to balance both the
employer and employee interests based upon what the government employer
reasonably thought was said, not on what the jury itself determines to have been said.
Consequently, the jury is unable to apply the Connick balancing test in a neutral
manner.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, by adopting the Connick balancing test in Acevedo,
purports to disassociate itself from the reasonableness standard of Waters. If true, one
could rationally argue that Acevedo provides more protection for public employee
speech rights. However, Vice Chief Justice Kauger's majority opinion in Acevedo casts
doubt on the actual intent of the state court.
For example, when discussing the application of the Connick test in balancing the
interests of the government employer and employee, Kauger writes: "In balancing
Acevedo's interest in protected speech against the potential disruptiveness of the
speech to police department operations, we find that the department reasonably and
in good faith believed Acevedo should be terminated for his disruptive speech."'45
As a result, it appears the majority in Acevedo has injected the language of a Waters
"reasonable belief standard" into what, by the majority's own recognition, is supposed
to be a pure Connick balancing test.
As a result of the majority's language, it is difficult to determine whether or not the
Acevedo standard affords more protection to public employees than Waters. If the
Oklahoma doctrine in Acevedo is enforced by strictly applying the Connick balancing
test, there is no doubt the level of protection would be greater. Employees in the
workplace, while not completely free to express matters of private concern,
nevertheless would be afforded a higher level of protection for speech involving issues
of public concern."' Consequently, if such a pure form of the Connick balancing test
exists in Oklahoma, public employees would also feel less hesitant to share potentially
important information regarding matters of public concern.'
143. See Acevedo v. City of Muskogee, 897 P.2d 256, 261 (Okla. 1995).
144. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1880-81 (1994).
145. Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 262 (emphasis added).
146. See supra note3 139-41 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (expressing belief that employees will choose to
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However, after taking the above statements into consideration, it is nevertheless
impossible to simply discount the "reasonableness" language of the Acevedo
majority."4 Perhaps in some latent form it represents a perceived future progression
in the eyes of the Oklahoma Supreme Court toward some type of Waters standard of
review. On the other hand, because of the state court's adamant disavowal of Waters,
it is doubtful that the state court intended any other result than one which could be
arrived at by applying a Connick balancing test.'49 Therefore, inferring solely from
the written opinion of Acevedo, it appears that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, by
adopting a pure Connick balancing test, has in essence created an Oklahoma public
employee speech doctrine that affords greater First Amendment protection than the
United States Supreme Court's reasonableness standard in Waters.
The above analysis serves to provide a comparison into the different level of speech
protection that the Acevedo and Waters doctrines offer public employees. However,
nowhere in the Acevedo opinion does the court base its decision to disavow Waters
solely on the fact that Waters is in some way faulty or inapplicable. Hence, in order
to justify the validity of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision to disavow Waters,
one must closely examine the rationale provided within Acevedo.
D. The Waters Question: Justifying the Oklahoma Supreme Court's Decision to
Disavow
While it is clear that the Oklahoma Supreme Court correctly chose to apply the
Connick balancing test, it is not as clear that the court made the right decision to
ignore the reasonable investigation/reasonable belief requirement of the Waters
plurality."5 This doubt is only magnified by the court's lack of justification for its
decision.' Furthermore, the fact that two Justices wrote concurring opinions, each
with a different theory as to why Waters should not be adopted, only adds to the
confusion." Therefore, in order to gain an understanding of Oklahoma's public
employee speech policy, one must first determine the court's intent behind the
disavowal of the Waters opinion. In order to do that, it is important to understand the
differing views on the validity of plurality decisions and how these views are
interrelated with the explanations of the justices in Acevedo."n The following
discussion is not meant to imply that any particular one of these views on the value
of plurality decisions should be adopted as the correct precedential interpretation of
remain silent rather than sharing important information with their employer).
148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text for a discussion on the "reasonableness" language
found in the majority opinion of Acevedo v. City of Muskogee, 897 P.2d 256 (Okla. 1995).
149. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 260-62 (Okla. 1995) (discussing a policy of disavowing Waters and
instead applying the Connick balancing test).
150. See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text for a complete discussion relating to the
application of the Connick balancing test in Acevedo.
151. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 260-61 (Okla. 1995) (holding by the majority that because the Waters
decision is a plurality, the court will instead follow the prior precedent of Connick).
152. See id. at 263, 266 (concurring opinions by Justice Opala and Special Judge Chapel attempting
to explain the court's decision to disavowal Waters).
153. See generally Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality
Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756 (1980).
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Waters. Rather, this discussion is an attempt to understand a possible rationale behind
the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision to disavowal Waters."
Of the accepted theories on the validity of plurality decisions, two are applicable
in the analysis of the Acevedo decision. The first view, known as the "strict classical
theory of precedent," deals with the historical value of previous cases. "According to
the strict classical theory of precedent, the lack of a clear majority rationale in support
of the judgment deprived the judgment of all precedential value, and the decision was
considered authority for the result only." 5 Since Justice Kauger failed to provide
a specific rationale in her majority opinion as to why the Acevedo court decided not
to adopt Waters, one could assume it was because the court had resolved to apply this
form of strict interpretation to plurality decisions."
Further credence to this theory can be provided if one accepts the rationale behind
Justice Opala's concurting opinion.'" Opala writes that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
acted correctly in applying the Connick balancing test in Acevedo." However, Opala
also states that it would be wrong for the court to adopt the Waters plurality opinion
until first done so by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit."'
Hence, Opala's fear of federal law in Oklahoma becoming dichotomized into two sets
of norms, one followed by the federal courts within the state and the other by the state
courts, serves to advance the strict classical theory of precedent with regard to the
value of plurality decisions."6
However, adopting such a policy of strict interpretation for all United States
Supreme Court plurality decisions would be, to say the least, a questionable action for
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to pursue. The United States Supreme Court's
pronouncement on substantial federal questions is arguably extremely persuasive for
state courts to follow. In addition, any conflicting decision rendered in a state supreme
court is likely to be overruled on appeal. Therefore, when considering the above
factors, one may question whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court's intent was to totally
disavow Waters.
Furthermore, if considered in conjunction with the concurring opinion of Special
Judge Chapel, the strict classical theory of precedent continues to lose credibility as
a viable explanation of the Acevedo court's decision not to adopt Waters.6' As
previously mentioned, Chapel seems to question the value of a per se investigation
requirement, not the importance of the governmental employer having to possess a
"reasonable belief' that the statements made by an employee do not constitute
154. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
155. Note, supra note 153, at 758 n.ll.
156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text for a full summary of Justice Opala's
concurring opinion in Acevedo.
158. See Acevedo v. City of Muskogee, 897 P.2d 256, 263 (Okla. 1995) (Opala, J., concurring).
159. See id. at 264 & n.2 (Opala, J., concurring).
160. See id at 264-65 (Opala, J., concurring).
161. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text for a full summary of Special Judge Chapel's
concurring opinion in Acevedo.
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protected speech." Furthermore, Chapel argues that the court should not rush to
disavow Waters, without first determining whether the case has any precedential
value.'" As a result, Chapel's and Opala's concurring opinions, both purporting to
explain the majority's decision not to apply Waters, instead act to contradict the other's
analysis, thereby providing no definitive explanation for the majority opinion.
Consequently, the strict classical theory of precedent, as asserted by Opala, offers at
best an incomplete explanation for the majority's decision.
The second approach commonly used to interpret the value of plurality opinions is
the "narrowest grounds theory."" This method proposes that where a United States
Supreme Court plurality decision appears to be of varying scope or breadth, the
opinion concurring in judgment on the "narrowest grounds" represents the highest
common denominator of the plurality agreement, and thus should be regarded as
authoritative for all other cases.'" As a general principle, those subscribing to this
doctrine consider the narrowest ground to represent "the result that would affect or
control the fewest cases in the future."'" Applying this method to the Waters
plurality provides lower courts with two possible options as to the narrowest
interpretation of the case." As mentioned earlier, Scalia rejected the concept of
requiring an employer to conduct a reasonable investigation before taking disciplinary
action.'" Hence, Scalia's opinion denounced the adoption of a new procedural
requirement, opting instead to follow the proven course of the Connick balancing
test.'" Therefore, since Scalia's opinion does not change the status quo established
in Connick, one could argue that it is the narrowest interpretation of Waters.
Hence, if Scalia's opinion is considered the narrowest interpretation, one could assert
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court reached the correct conclusion in Acevedo. This is
because both Scalia and the Acevedo court conclude that Connick should be the
controlling standard for public employee speech cases. However, for such a
conclusion to be valid, the majority in Acevedo would have to have based their
decision not to adopt Waters on the rationale in Scalia's concurring opinion. The
problem with this analysis is that the majority in Acevedo failed to provide an
explanation as to why they chose not to apply the Waters reasonable investigation
standard.'" In addition, neither Justice Opala's or Special Judge Chapel's concurring
opinions specifically employ Scalia's reasoning.
162. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 266-67 (Chapel, S.J., concurring).
163. See id. at 267 (Chapel, S.J., concurring).
164. See generally Note, supra note 153, at 761-67 (discussing the "narrowest grounds" approach
to determining the precedential value of plurality decisions).
165. See id.
166. Id. at 764.
167. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text for a full summary of Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Waters v. Churchill.
168. See Waters v. Churchill 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1893-98 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
170. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d 256, 260-61 (Okla. 1995) ("Waters is a plurality opinion. Therefore,
we rest our pronouncement ... upon ... prior Supreme Court precedent .... .
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The second possible method of applying the narrowest interpretation approach to
Waters would be through Justice Souter's concurring opinion.' Souter asserted that
a reasonable investigation requirement would be a useless standard unless the
governmental employer actually believed the results from the investigation into the
alleged employee speech incident.'" Hence, one attempting to use the "narrowest
grounds" approach to determine the value of the Waters plurality could make the
argument that Souter's opinion is a more narrow interpretation of the overall rule in
Waters. Such an argument thus asserts that the true precedential value of the plurality
is Souter's opinion." .
However, the fact that Souter's concurring opinion in Waters could be considered
the narrowest interpretation of the case still does not explain why the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Acevedo failed to adopt the reasonableness standard of Waters. In
fact, if Souter's opinion was viewed as precedent, hence requiring all employers to
actually believe the results of their investigation, then the Acevedo court should have
adopted such a policy as Souter recommends. Instead, the Acevedo court disavows
Waters, leaving no meaningful rationale in its opinion to serve as justification for its
decision.74
Consequently, neither the "strict classical theory of precedent" nor the "narrowest
grounds approach" provides an adequate explanation as to why the Oklahoma Supreme
Court chose to disavow Waters. In addition, since Justice Opala and Special Judge
Chapel gave seemingly different reasons for the court's decision not to apply Waters,
it is questionable as to whether Acevedo would stand up to a review by the United
States Supreme Court."5 Once again, the problem with Acevedo returns to the fact
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not fully explain its rationale. In failing to do
so, it has left enough open-ended questions to criticize its validity.'76
E. Long-Term Viability of the Acevedo Public Employee Speech Doctrine
Hence, if it is true that the majority in Acevedo has failed to adequately explain why
the plurality opinion of Waters should not be followed, then does it also mean that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision lacks validity? Arguably, a case could be made
that by not adopting Waters, Oklahoma is acting unconstitutionally by failing to
acknowledge an established United States Supreme Court doctrine.
Despite the fact that the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision to disavow Waters
does not appear to be justified through either of the two theories relating to the
treatment of plurality opinions, nevertheless, perhaps there is an adequate explanation
171. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1891-93 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
172. See id. at 1891-92 (Souter, J., concurring).
173. See generally Note, supra note 153, at 761-67 (discussing the "narrowest grounds" approach
to determining the value of plurality decisions).
174. See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the standard of review
adopted by the Acevedo court.
175. See supra note 152 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Opala and Special Judge
Chapel's concurring opinicns.
176. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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behind the state's decision."7 Prior to Acevedo, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was
never called upon to address a public employee First Amendment freedom of speech
issue. As a result, until 1995, such public employee speech cases arising in Oklahoma
were decided in federal court. Consequently, when rendering a decision in Acevedo,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court lacked prior state precedent and therefore, was required
to look to the federal courts for guidance. However, it appears the state court found
federal precedent conflicting."
The source of this conflict seems to originate from the relatively recent Waters
decision. As a result of this recency, Waters has yet to be applied within all of the
federal circuits. However, as of April 1995, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had
already cited to the Waters reasonableness standard in two cases, thereby raising the
question of whether the Tenth Circuit had in fact recognized Waters."
Justice Opala's concurring opinion in Acevedo, however, seems to assert that Waters
had, as of April 1995, not yet been implemented by the Tenth Circuit."n As a result,
Opala justifies the majority's conclusion to disavow Waters on the basis that the
plurality decision lacked the acknowledgment of the Tenth Circuit.'8'
In an explanation, Justice Opala writes, "Although [Appellant] sought a review upon
the Waters'standards, [the Oklahoma Supreme Court] cannot comply with his request.
Were we to follow the plurality opinion [of Waters] we would be impermissibly
dichotomizing federal law within this State."'" Hence, Opala seemed concerned
about creating two standards of federal law within Oklahoma, one standard applying
the substantive federal law interpretations of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and
a second standard originating from the state's own interpretation of federal law."
Consequently, if this sentiment from Justice Opala's concurring opinion is shared
by the rest of the justices on the Oklahoma Supreme Court, there is no reason to
expect the Acevedo doctrine to exist for much longer than a few years. Eventually, the
district courts within the Tenth Circuit will begin applying Waters to public employee
speech cases."n After that, it is only a matter of time before one of these cases
comes before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.'" When this occurs, there is no
reason to believe the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals will choose to do anything other
177. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
178. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 264-65 (Opala, J., concurring).
179. See Schiller v. Moore, 30 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing to the Waters
reasonableness standard); Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 827 n.39 (10th
Cir. 1995).
180. See Acevedo, 897 P.2d at 264 n.12 (Opala, J., concurring).
181. See id. (Opala, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 264 (Opala, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
183. See id. at 264 & n.12 (Opala, J., concurring).
184. Two such district cases have already cited the Waters plurality opinion. See Baird v. Cutler,
883 F. Supp. 591, 598 (D. Utah 1995); Ruff v. City of Leavenworth, 858 F. Supp. 1546, 1552 (D. Kan.
1994).
185. By the time of the Acevedo decision two such cases had already come before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. However, it appears Justice Opala is not yet convinced the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has expressly adopted Waters. See Schiller v. Moore, 30 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1994);
Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 827 (10th Cir. 1995).
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than accept Waters." At such a point, Tenth Circuit substantive law regarding
public employee speech rights will align with the United States Supreme Court's stated
policy, thereby eliminating the threat of the Oklahoma Supreme Court inadvertently
dichotomizing federal law within the state."n Hence, it is possible to argue that the
adoption of the Water, "reasonableness standard" by the Tenth Circuit will pave the
way for the eventual demise of the Acevedo balancing test in Oklahoma."
In the end, one thing is certain: the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision will not
be overturned on appeal. The Appellant, Acevedo, has chosen not to petition the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari." Hence, there are three
possible outcomes as to the longevity of the Acevedo balancing doctrine. The first
possibility is that the doctrine will continue to function as an acceptable method of
determining the degree of protection afforded to public employee speech. However,
since the United States Supreme Court has already acted in Waters to establish a rule
addressing public employee speech rights, it is questionable whether a conflicting
policy can survive." Thus, the second possibility is that the Acevedo standard was
unconstitutional the moment it was created, superseded instead by the existing United
States Supreme Court policy. Finally, as mentioned, there is the possibility that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court will-continue to apply the Acevedo balancing test until the
Tenth Circuit officially adopts the Waters plurality opinion, at which time Oklahoma
will begin applying a "reasonableness" standard to its balancing test. 9'
Whichever of the above three versions actually occurs, there is no question that a
shadow of doubt will continue to loom over the Acevedo balancing standard,
questioning its constitutionality. The final outcome regarding Acevedo's
constitutionality signifies much more than a mere satisfying of academic curiosity. It
also represents an answer to the important question of whether or not the Oklahoma
doctrine actually affords public employee speech greater First Amendment protection
than that provided by the federal doctrine."9 Hence, the viability of Acevedo
becomes a practical is:sue. That is to say, the survival of Acevedo could eventually
lead to an increase of public employee speech cases being filed in Oklahoma courts,
where the level of spech protection might be considered to be greater than that
offered in the federal courts."
186. See supra note 185.
187. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Opala's concern of
dichotornizing federal law within Oklahoma.
188. Note also that because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had already cited to Waters in two
cases before the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Acevedo, it is possible the state's decision was
inconsistent with the Tenth Circuit precedent the moment it was rendered. See supra note 185 listing the
two cases cited by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
189. Telephone Interview with William Hinkle, attorney for Art Acevedo (Nov. 15, 1995).
190. See generally supra notes 56-75 and accompanying text discussing the Waters decision.
191. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text discussing the issue of whether or not the Tenth
Circuit has officially adopted Waters.
192. See supra notes 126-48 and accompanying text for a discussion into whether Acevedo or
Waters affords public employees greater speech rights.
193. See supra notes 126-48 and accompanying text.
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F. Acevedo and the Oklahoma Constitution: Another Angle
In addition to deciding to apply a balancing standard to cases involving a question
of First Amendment protection and public employee speech, the Acevedo court
expressly stated that it would not hesitate to protect an employee's speech rights under
the Oklahoma Constitution."9 Justice Opala expanded this belief in his concurring
opinion. Opala wrote:
Had Acevedo [(Appellant)] raised any state constitutional argument, I
would not be hesitant today to adopt an expanded version of the Waters
plurality command as this State's prophylactic rule of due process under
Art. 2, §7 Okl. Const., to be engrafted upon the free-speech guarantee of
Art. 2, §22 Okl. Const., which would provide added protection for state
and local government employees against constitutionally impermissible
dismissal, based solely on speech, by mandating a pre-discharge (or pre-
suspension) adversary administrative hearing to be held before a neutral
and detached agency official.9 '
As a result, it appears that the Oklahoma Supreme Court might be willing to adopt
the Waters concept of a "reasonable investigation" for issues regarding public
employee speech rights brought against the backdrop of the Oklahoma
Constitution." s However, Opala does not elaborate on the degree necessary to state
that the belief of a "reasonable employer," as to what an employee allegedly said,
would have to be adopted as fact at an investigative hearing. Therefore, it is
questionable as to whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court would choose to adopt the
entire "reasonableness" standard of Waters for cases involving the speech rights of
public employees and the Oklahoma Constitution.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Justice Opala stated that had Acevedo
applied the reasonableness standard of Waters, the city (Appellee), because of its
comprehensive pretermination hearing, would have been able to successfully meet a
Waters reasonable investigation requirement." Hence, it is possible that not all
Oklahoma Supreme Court justices are expressly against the reasonableness standard
of Waters. Rather, they appear more concerned about the precedential value of the
plurality opinion as it pertains to First Amendment speech issues. 98 If this is in fact
the case, and the justices are willing to apply a Waters standard to a state
constitutional issue of employee speech rights, there is little doubt that some form of
a reasonableness standard will eventually find its way into Oklahoma law."9
194. See Acevedo v. City of Muskogee, 897 P.2d 256, 262 (Okla. 1995); see also id. at 262 n. 18.
195. Id. at 265 (Opala, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
196. See id. (Opala, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 264 (Opala, J., concurring).
198. See id. at 260-61.
199. See supra note 193-94 and accompanying text.
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V1. Conclusion
The decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Acevedo v. City of Muskogee
represents more than an attempt to resolve a public employee speech issue based on
an alleged violation of an individual's First Amendment rights. Acevedo, more
importantly, depicts what appears to be Oklahoma's disavowal of the United States
Supreme Court's proo2dural doctrine of public employee speech as established in
Waters and, thus, the creation of an independent public employee speech doctrine.
However, the creation of such a doctrine brings with it many questions. Foremost
is the concern about the impact a new doctrine will have in resolving public employee
speech issues. Oklahoma's doctrine, which employs a Connick-type interest balancing
test, might be considered a more natural balance than the federal doctrine. Conse-
quently, Oklahoma courts could become an appealing location for public employees
searching for a place with less deference toward the governmental employee.
Precisely how Oklahoma's balancing doctrine will be interpreted is still unknown.
There is a good argument to be made that the Acevedo balancing test was never
constitutional and should therefore be disregarded. However, this issue will not readily
be answered since Acevedo decided not to pursue an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. Hence, the only way to determine the doctrine's constitutionality will
be for another public employee speech case to be brought in the Oklahoma court
system.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court opened a Pandora's box when it decided not to apply
the Waters reasonableness standard. In doing so, the court created a rift between
federal and state law. Consequently, one may argue that the result the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had hoped to avoid, a dichotomizing of federal law within the state,
seems to be the result that has occurred. In the end, the original question remains: Is
the Acevedo decision sound policy or a form of doctrinal mutiny? At present, the
answer remains hidden behind a cloud of uncertainty, waiting for future mandates
from the Oklahoma Supreme Court to either amend or reinforce the Acevedo doctrine.
Timothy Wilson
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